

Irish political activity in Spain during the Restoration¹

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During the tumultuous early 1660s, the Spanish monarchy believed that maintaining its relations with Ireland was essential so long as war with England still seemed likely. However, on the international stage, the notion of a balance of power between states gradually had begun to take hold in many of the courts of Europe from the 1650s onwards. Thereafter, the determination of absolute rulers to expand their dynastic territories and the growth of global commercial rivalry between the Great Powers increasingly shaped European politics and warfare. In responding to this evolving international context, Madrid desperately needed to foster good relations with the British and Dutch maritime powers and therefore desisted from interference in Irish affairs. Meanwhile within the Spanish territories, a number of long-term developments combined to diminish the Irish community's considerable influence and specifically its role in swaying Spain's political decisions. This essay traces how that configuration of international political alliances, the decline of the Spanish monarchy and the waning influence of the Irish community caused a handful of Irish lobbyists in Madrid to become more politically astute and pragmatic in presenting their case to the Spanish king and, in the process, to become successful in mobilising Spanish support for the campaign to preserve Catholicism in Ireland in the early 1660s.

The 1640s and 1650s witnessed a phase of particularly intense and dramatic relations between the Spanish monarchy and Irish Catholics.² However, with the settlement of the Franco-Spanish war in 1659 and the restoration of the monarchy in England under the Stuarts in 1660, a new dimension to the international political context emerged. At the same time, the Spanish monarchy finally ceded its role as Europe's leading continental Catholic power to France.³

¹I am much obliged to the participants on the Restoration Ireland conference (Dublin, September 2004) and to the organisers, Colman A. Dennehy and John Gibney. ² See Igor Pérez Tostado, 'Looking for "powerful friends": Irish and English political activity in the Spanish monarchy, 1640-1660' (unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2004). ³ See Jean-Frédéric Schaub, *La France espagnole: les racines hispaniques de l'absolutisme français* (Paris, 2003).

During the early 1660s the Spanish king, Philip IV (d. 1665) still planned a policy of aggressive intervention in English and Irish affairs. However, before the end of that decade, Spanish policy in relation to northern Europe was, to some extent, mortgaged to the Dutch Republic and King Charles II (1630-85) of England. Maintaining amicable relations with the maritime powers was essential in Spain's efforts to protect the Spanish Netherlands from French attack. Within the Spanish realm which was in crisis, the Irish community too was experiencing serious difficulties. Still wrestling with the problematic legacy of the 1650s, the community was further weakened by return migration to Ireland. In this gloomy context, the coterie of Irish involved in political activity in Spanish territories adapted their plans both to the reduced power and resources of the Spanish monarchy and to their own community's increasing internal weaknesses. Consequently, the proposals that they presented to the Spanish crown were less ambitious than those mooted in previous years and more realistic in their conception and aspirations.

The high hopes generated in the Spanish territories by the restoration of the monarchy in England were quickly dashed. King Charles II's early expressions of friendship towards Philip IV in practical terms amounted to little more than a cessation of hostilities which left many highly contentious issues unresolved. However, the goodwill and gestures of deference shown towards Spanish representatives, evident during Charles's stay in The Hague during the late 1650s, did continue during the ceremonies to celebrate the royal family's return to England in May 1660. Normal diplomatic relations between London and Madrid were soon restored when the marquis of Conflans, nephew of the next ordinary Spanish ambassador between 1660 and 1664, Charles Watteville, was dispatched as extraordinary ambassador to London to congratulate the king. Meanwhile Henry Bennet, earl of Arlington (1618-85), who had been left in Spain by Charles II as his agent in Madrid, was knighted and raised to the formal status of resident ambassador.⁴ For his part, Philip IV opened his ports to English ships, even though no formal negotiation had actually taken place and no treaty was signed.⁵ This situation contrasted with

⁴ Publicación de la suspensión de armas entre Inglaterra y España, July 1660 (Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid (hereinafter BNM), Manuscrito (hereafter MS) 2396, ff 172-3v.); order of Philip IV, July 1660 (National Archives of the UK: Public Record Office London State Papers Spain (hereinafter TNA: PRO SP Spain (SP 94)), leg. 44, ff 71-72; Gazette of Madrid, 3 Aug. 1660 (BNM, MS 2396, ff 170-71v.); Gazette of Madrid, 25 July 1660 (BNM, MS 2396, ff 177-8v.); Charles II to Philip IV, 30 July 1660 (Archivo General de Simancas (hereinafter AGS), Estado (hereinafter E.), leg. 2097; Charles II to Alonso Pérez de Vivero, 6 Aug. 1660 (TNA: PRO SP Spain (94), leg. 44, f. 74).⁵ Philip IV to the duke of Alba, 13 Sept. 1660 (Archivo General de Indias (hereinafter, AGI), Indiferente (hereafter Indf), leg. 430, 40, ff 215-6v.); Philip IV to Luis Enriquez de Guzman, 25 Sept. 1660 (AGI, Indf, leg. 430, L. 40). In spite of the peace, strict orders are given to prevent English smuggling into Spanish ports of America. See Philip IV to Luis Enriquez de Guzmán, 13 Sept. 1660 (AGI, Indf., lego 430, L. 40).

initially frosty relations maintained with the ambassadors of France and Portugal.⁶ During 1660 the Spanish monarchy hoped to maintain a close friendship with England and create an alliance in opposition to Portugal. It was hoped at the Spanish court that this alliance could be built on the former Royalist exiles' personal bonds of gratitude to Philip IV. In addition, the Spanish viewed peace with England as an essential prerequisite for ensuring territorial integrity and security of the Spanish American colonies. Confident that it had secured its hold on the Southern Netherlands by diplomatic means, the Spanish monarchy wished to re-deploy its military and economic resources in the campaign to subjugate Portugal.⁷

However, these expectations soon began to fade. It became apparent that the restoration of the monarchy in England was not as positive a development for the advancement of Spanish interests as had been hoped. It soon emerged that the territories occupied during the Cromwellian War would not be returned to Spain as Philip IV and Charles II had agreed in 1656. In August 1660 Esteban de Gamarra, Spanish ambassador in The Hague, wrote to the Spanish favourite, Don Luis de Haro (1598-1661), admitting that their chances of recovering Dunkirk and Jamaica were slim.⁸ By January 1661, the now ordinary Spanish ambassador in London, Charles Watteville resolved to refrain from exerting any further pressure in relation to this issue. Instead of causing tension with the British monarchy, Philip IV considered it more politic to sacrifice those territories in the interests of securing much needed English neutrality in Portugal.⁹

In a move that sparked outrage at the Spanish court, Dunkirk was finally sold to France by the treaty of October 1662. Meanwhile, Jamaica remained firmly in English hands and Spanish fears of an Anglo-Portuguese alliance escalated.¹⁰ Already, in the summer of 1660, the Portuguese had offered Charles II the hand of Catherine of Bragança (1638-1705), daughter of King John IV (1604-56) of Portugal, together with a military alliance.¹¹ Watteville complained that 'there are so many schemes and secret treaties with the Portuguese, who have so many protectors here' that he could do nothing to prevent them, especially as he had no money for expenses.¹² The Spanish

⁶ Charles II to Luis de Haro, 1 June 1660 (TNA: PRO SP Spain (SP 94), leg. 44, ff 12-12V.); Luis de Haro to Charles II, 6 June 1660 (TNA: PRO SP Spain (SP 94), leg. 44, ff 10-11); minute of Esteban de Gamarra to Luis de Haro, 30 June 1660 (AGS, E., leg. 8473). ⁷ Account of the tercios and regiments, 23 Oct. 1660 (AGS, E., leg. 2098). ⁸ Minute of Esteban de Gamarra to Luis de Haro, 11 Aug. 1660 (AGS, E., leg. 8473, ff 204-6). ⁹ Even if Watteville toyed with the idea that the Southern Netherlands could collect a sufficient sum of money to recover Dunkirk from England (and Jamaica too), by early 1661 he had lost faith in his plan. See Charles Watteville to Philip IV, 13 Jan. 1661 (AGS, E., leg. 2531). ¹⁰ Esteban de Gamarra to -, 9 May 1663 (AGI, Indf. leg. 1668, ff 469-70). ¹¹ Consulta of the council of state, 19 Feb. 1661 (AGS, E., leg. 2531); Charles Watteville to Philip IV, 13 Jan. 1661 (AGS, E., leg. 2531); consulta of the Council of State, 31 May 1662 (AGS, E., leg. 2532). ¹² 'ay tantas maquinas y tratados secretos con

ambassador brandished the Anglo-Spanish treaty of 1630, Charles's promises of 1656 and even a profitable offer of marriage with a princess of Orange in an attempt to prevent Charles from marrying Catherine.¹³ In the event, however, his efforts failed: the Portuguese match was finalised in April 1662, as part of the military alliance signed with Alfonso VI, king of Portugal (1656-83). Philip IV's amicable policy had failed, but during the early 1660s, any sacrifice made for the sake of recovering Portugal was deemed justified in Madrid.¹⁴ 'Experience has show us', Esteban de Gamarra lamented in 1663, 'how little one can trust ... the English who, if they see an opportunity of gain, won't give up until obtaining it'.¹⁵ Consequently, when the Spanish realised that gifts, bribes and old treaties could not discourage the English monarchy from sheltering the Portuguese crown from Spanish aggression, it was hoped that a new revolution in England could prevent her from further obstructing Spain's pursuit of its goals.

As Robert Stradling in his study of Spanish conspiracy in England during 1661-3 has demonstrated, the Spanish monarchy attempted to mobilise opposition to Charles II in order to plunge the British Isles into chaos once again.¹⁶ Madrid hoped to turn the dock back to the 1640s, when domestic troubles had prevented Charles I from intervening in European politics. As usual, Ireland played an important rôle in Spanish interventionist hopes. In addition, the Spanish king counted on the support of sympathetic Catholic figures at the English court, among them George Digby, second earl of Bristol (1612-77), and Henry Bennet, first earl of Arlington (1612-77), who had been Charles II's agent in Spain in the period 1657-61. However, owing to many changes that occurred in the intervening decades, these Spanish conspiracies ended in failure.

The agent sent by Madrid to London in 1662 was an Irishman, Patricio Moledi, servant of the duke of Medina de las Torres (d. 1668).¹⁷ His official

Portugueses, que tienen aca tantos protectores'. See Charles Watteville to Philip IV, 13 Jan. 1661 (AGS, E. lego 2531).¹³ M. Herrero Sánchez, 'La perduración de la cuestión irlandesa: un obstáculo en las relaciones anglo-españolas durante la segunda mitad del siglo XVII' in Enrique García Hernán, Miguel Angel de Bunes and Óscar Recio Morales (eds), *Irlanda y la monarquía Hispánica. Kinsale, 1601-2001: guerra, política, exilio y religión* (Madrid, 2002), p. 414 (hereinafter García Hernán et al. (eds), *Irlanda y la monarquía Hispánica*).¹⁴ Since December 1640, English relations with Portugal and especially commercial ties had been one of the greatest obstacles to Philip IV's recovery of the kingdom. See Rafael Valladares, *La rebelión de Portugal: guerra, conflicto y poderes en la monarquía Hispánica, 1640-1680* (Valladolid, 1998), pp 60 ff and *idem*, *Felipe IV y la restauración de Portugal* (Málaga, 1994).¹⁵ 'La experiencia nos ha enseñado cuan poco debe fiarse de ingleses que si ven la suya no dejaran de lograrla'. See Esteban de Gamarra to -, 9 May 1663 (AGI, Indf, lego 1668, ff 469-70).¹⁶ R.A. Stradling, 'Spanish conspiracy in England, 1661-1663' in *English Historical Review*, 87 (1972), pp 269-86 (hereinafter Stradling, 'Spanish conspiracy').¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 274. For a discussion of Ramiro Núñez de Guzmán, duke of Medina de las Torres and his political career, see Robert A. Stradling, *Spain's struggle for Europe, 1598-1668* (London, 1994).

mission was to resume negotiations after Watteville's disgrace, which had resulted from a celebrated conflict with the French ambassador regarding precedence. Secretly, however, the purpose of Moledi's mission was to promote rebellion against Charles II. He was instructed to follow the commands of Luis de Benavides, marquis of Caracena and governor of the Spanish Low Countries, who was a keen advocate of a scheme to stage simultaneous uprisings in England and Ireland. Opponents of the Restoration government who commanded suitable ports in Ireland were to be assisted by a Spanish armada which would be dispatched from Galicia. Plans followed those outlined for the 1601 expedition to Kinsale and subsequent projected descents.¹⁸ Caracena's second agent in London was another Irishman, Ignatius White of Limerick, the future marquis of Albeville.¹⁹ During his stay in London in 1662, White distributed money provided by Caracena in efforts to instigate plots, both in England and Ireland, against monarchical authority.

Although these Spanish agents soon aroused the suspicion of the English government, no conclusive evidence was found to incriminate them and in any case their schemes collapsed.²⁰ However, these failed conspiracies are of significance for a number of reasons. The Spanish agents in England and Ireland were more closely connected with the former republicans (supporters of the Commonwealth, 1649-60) than they were with the Catholic population of either country. This marked a continuation of the policy advocated by Alonso de Cárdenas (Spanish agent and ambassador in London between 1638 and 1655) during the 1650s.²¹ In Ireland, those who backed an alliance with the Spanish included Catholic clergy and gentry, but also those who acquired land under the Cromwellian settlement and who now feared a reversal of that settlement.²² As in the recent Anglo-Spanish war (1655-60), the Spanish monarchy again encouraged all political groups who sought the overthrow of the English government to rebel, regardless of their contradictory long-term goals. Once more, Catholicism served as the rallying cause to unite disaffected elements and provided the necessary political justification for Spanish interference in British affairs. However, even if it offered new possibilities for Spanish intervention, the diversity of the groups supported by Spain undermined the coherence that had previously underpinned the discourse of justified intervention.

¹⁸ Stradling, 'Spanish conspiracy', p. 274. On previous Spanish attempts see J.J. Silke, *Kinsale: the Spanish intervention in Ireland at the end of the Elizabethan wars* (Liverpool, 1970); Óscar Recio Morales, *El socorro de Irlanda en 1601 y la contribución del ejército a la Integración social de los irlandeses en España* (Madrid, 2002); C. O'Sceá, 'The significance and legacy of Spanish intervention in West Munster during the battle of Kinsale' in Thomas O'Connor and Mary Ann Lyons (eds), *Irish migrants in Europe after Kinsale, 1602-1820* (Dublin, 2003), pp 32-63. ¹⁹ E.S.D. Beer, 'The marquis of Albeville and his brothers' in *English Historical Review*, 45 (1930), pp 397-408. ²⁰ *Ibid.* ²¹ Alastair MacFadyen, 'Anglo-Spanish relations, 1625-1660' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Liverpool, 1967), pp 48-66. ²² S.J. Connolly, *Religión, law and power: the making of Protestant Ireland, 1660-1760* (Oxford, 1995), pp 24-40.

A move towards a decisive resolution of the crisis in relations between the two monarchs came in 1664 with the arrival in London of a new Spanish ambassador, the naval commander and diplomat, the conde de Molina. His appointment was prompted by a series of ominous developments at the Spanish court, notably, the preparations for a long regency government (during the reign of Philip IV's successor, Charles II (1665-70)), further Spanish military defeats in Portugal and mounting hostilities with France which eventually erupted in the devolution war in 1667.²³ On the one hand, this war forced the Spanish monarchy to give up all hope of recovering Portugal and obliged Spain to accept the peace treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1668).²⁴ On the other, the Spanish regency's desperate dependence on English support in withstanding French aggression had led to the signing of a new commercial agreement in 1667. Another treaty, signed three years later, placed both political and commercial relations between Spain and England on an amicable footing.²⁵ Down to the end of the seventeenth century, Spanish strategy in Europe was aimed at persuading maritime powers, through offers of attractive commercial concessions in its markets, to lend their support to the defence of Spanish northern territories from French aggression.²⁶ In short, the focus of Spain's policy was on political survival and the monarchy could not afford to be swayed by complicating religious or moral considerations. In this climate, intervention in Ireland held no appeal for the king.

What was happening in relation to the Irish within the Spanish territories during this period? Naturally, changes in the cycle of war and peace had the greatest impact on the military element within the community. As a consequence of reduced Spanish military activity in the Low Countries after the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 and the contemporaneous reactivation of the Portuguese front, the Spanish authorities carried out several redeployments of troops in the 1660s. The size of the Army of Flanders was dramatically reduced in order to cut costs and to release units for service in the Iberian Peninsula. While still in the pay of the Spanish king, Charles Stuart fiercely and successfully opposed early measures aimed at disbanding troops then under his command in Flanders.²⁷ However, after Charles was crowned king of England in April 1661, the number of Irish soldiers serving under the Spanish banner in Flanders declined rapidly as shown in table 1.²⁸

²³ Keith Feiling, *British foreign policy, 1660-1672* (London, 1930), p. 173. ²⁴ Memorial about the negotiations of the English ministers, 1668 (Biblioteca Ajuda, Lisboa, MS 51- VIII-43, f. 296); *The memoirs of Anne, Lady Halkett and Ann, Lady Farnshawe*, ed. John Loftis (Oxford, 1979), pp. 91-192.

²⁵ Feiling, *British foreign policy*, pp. 168-83, 232-66. ²⁶ Manuel Herrero Sánchez, *El acercamiento hispano-neerlandés, 1648-1678* (Madrid, 2000). ²⁷ Reasons of Charles II not to disband his units in the Army of Flanders, 13 Mar. 1660 (AGS, E., leg. 2097). Caracena had no other option than to maintain the troops under Charles II as they stood, much to the disgust of the Spanish soldiery and the local population. See Caracena to Philip IV, 18 Mar. 1660 (AGS, E. leg. 2097). ²⁸ See the evolution of the Irish units in the Spanish army during the Restoration

Table 1: Irish troops serving in the army of Flanders (1661-85)²⁹

| Year | 1661 | 1665 | 1670 | 1673 | 1675 | 1678 | 1679 | 1684 | 1685 |
|--------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Troops | 1,702 | 37 | 242 | 301 | 434 | 267 | 257 | 340 | 439 |

As table 1 shows, in 1661 there were 1,702 Irish troops in Flanders, which was slightly above the average strength of the Irish presence in the Army of Flanders during the period 1621-68, as calculated by Stradling.³⁰ However, within four years, due to the disbandment of the army, the number of Irish declined to a mere 37. None the less, the return to war in the Low Countries after 1667 helped rebuild the Irish military presence to an average of just over 300 and it remained at that level and above throughout the remainder of the period under review.

In the early 1650s the Iberian Peninsula had been the main destination of Irish levies, amounting to about 18,000 men. It is well known that transport conditions and the hardships associated with service in the Iberian front, together with attempts to make them change sides, gave rise to serious doubts about the loyalty and fighting efficiency of the Irish units. Already in the early 1640s, Francisco de Melo, then governor-general of the Spanish Low Countries, regretted bringing Irish soldiers to the Iberian Peninsula. He declared: 'the Irish are so badly disciplined ... I am sorry that they enter Spain. Yet, he grudgingly admitted, 'since we see our enemies so strong and two wars of such a scale, it is necessary [to have) men and foreigners.'³¹

However, by 1660 the Spanish governor, the above-mentioned conde de

in relation to cost, 11 Jan. 1662 (AGS, E., leg. 2099); reform of the regiments of Flanders, 11 Jan. 1662 (AGS, E., leg. 2099); report on the distribution of money in the Army, 3 May 1662 (AGS, E., leg. 2100); report on the Army of Flanders, Nov. 1669 (AGS, E., leg. 2110); report on the Army of Flanders, 11 Mar. 1670 (AGS, E., leg. 2115); report on the Army of Flanders, 11 Mar. 1670 (AGS, E., leg. 2121); report on the Army of Flanders, 23 Aug. 1672 (AGS, E., leg. 2119); muestra of the Army of Flanders, Mar. 1675 (AGS, E., leg. 2128); Charles II to Pedro Coloma, 23 Apr. 1678 (AGS, E. leg. 2135); muestra of the Army of Flanders, 19 Nov. 1678 (AGS, E., leg. 3862); muestra of the Army of Flanders, 19 July 1679 (AGS, E., leg. 3865); planta of the Army of Flanders, 1684 (AGS, E., leg. 3876); report on the tercios and companies in Flanders, 1684 (AGS, E., leg. 3876); report on the Army of Flanders, 1685 (AGS, E., leg. 3876); report on the Army of Flanders, 1690 (AGS, E., leg. 3883); distribution of the winter garrisons in Flanders, 1690 (AGS, E. leg. 3883).²⁹ Data for the table extracted from AGS, E., leg. 2115 sin folio (hereafter s.f.); AGS, E., leg. 2119 s.f.; AGS, E., leg. 2121 s.f.; AGS, E., leg. 2128 s.f.; AGS, E., leg. 3862 s.f.; AGS, E., leg. 3865 s.f.; AGS, E., leg. 3876 s.f.; AGS, E., leg. 3883 s.f.; AGS, E., leg. 3885 s.f.; AGS, E., leg. 3891 s.f.; AGS, E., leg. 3893 s.f.³⁰ Roben A. Stradling, *The Spanish monarchy and the Irish mercenaries: the Wild Ceese in Spain, 1618-68* (Dublin, 1994), p. 140.³¹ 'los Irlandeses son tan mal disciplinados que yo siento mucho que entren en España, pero como vemos los enemigos tan fuertes y dos guerras tales es menester gente y extranjeros y así V. M. mandara tomar la resolución que fuere servido.' See Francisco de Melo to Philip IV, 10 Oct. 1643 (AGS, E., leg. 2161).

Caracena enthusiastically supported schemes for transporting Irish regiments to Spain, declaring

There are three Irish tercios, one of them of very good quality which has around five hundred men, and the maestro de campo, who is UamesJ Dempsey will go willingly [to Spain]. The two others are not so good, and could be cut down to one. On this matter there are two difficulties, one is that there is no reason to leave this country so lacking in men and it should be better if one of these two tercios should remain, as has been always the case, and with time it would be possible to recruit and send another one.³²

Caracena also planned to reform the six regiments left behind by Charles Stuart at the time of his restoration. His aim was to bring them to the Iberian Peninsula where the short supply of reliable soldiers had become a serious problem.³³ In the face of a constant shortage of men, the commanders of the Army of Extremadura in the southwest of Spain grew concerned in 1660 when a great number of Irish soldiers asked leave in order to return to their country.³⁴ However, the Council of War declared that few inconveniences should be put in the way of those willing to leave:

the living Irish officers who expect a licence with a legitima te cause, should be granted one and have me informed, and the soldiers of the

³² 'De Irlandeses ay tres tercios uno deBos es de muy buena calidad y tendrá cerca de quinientos hombres y el maestro de campo que es Dempsey [James Dempsey] ira de muy buena gana. Los otros dos no son tan buenos, y se podría reducir a uno. En esto se encuentran dos dificultades, la una que no parece razón dejar este país tan desprovido de gente y que así convendría que quedase uno de estos tercios, como ha habido siempre pues con el tiempo se podría reclutar y enviar otro.' See report on the tercios of the Army of Flanders, 23 Oct. 1660 (AGS, E., lego 2^o98). About Dempsey and his unit see *Wild Geese in Spanish Flanders, 1582-1700: documents relating chiefly to Irish regiments, from the Archives Générales du Royaume, Brussels, and other sources*, ed. Brendan Jennings (Dublin, 1964), p. 20 and documents 2105 (p. 612 n.), 2318 (p. 623 n.), 2320, 2322-6, 2341,2372,2375-6,2378-9,2382-3,2401, 2404, 2406,2409,2415-8, 2420-2,2425-6,2428-31,2439,2442,2445,2448,2450-1,2455,2462,2471,2473,2507,2509,2518,2540,2546,2557,2563, 2585, 2601, 2706 and 2806. The tercio was the normal unit of troops under the command of a maestro de campo; it varied in size from under 100 to over 1,000 men. ³³ Relation of the tercios of the Army of Flanders, 23 Oct. 1660 (AGS, E., lego 2098). For the Spanish monarchy's handling of the problem in Extremadura see consulta of the Council of State, 30 Apr. 1661 (AGS, E., lego 2098); consulta of the Council of State, 31 July 1661 (AGS, E., lego 2098); Juan d'Este to Philip IV, 11 Aug. 1661 (AGS, Guerra Moderna (hereinafter GM) Tierra, lego 1981); consulta of the Council of War, 17 Aug. 1661 (AGS, GM Tierra, lego 1981); Juan d'Este to Philip IV, 22 Aug. 1661 (AGS, GM Tierra, lego 1981); report on the gente de guerra, 7 Sept. 1661 (AGS, E., lego 2098); consulta of the Council of War, 19 Sept. 1661 (AGS, GM Tierra, lego 1981); reform of the Army of Extremadura, 24 Sept. 1661 (AGS, GM Tierra, lego 1981). ³⁴ Consulta of the Council of War, 19 Sept. 1661 (AGS, GM, lego 1981).

same nation should ask their officers and these [officers] be heeded in what they should say, in order to take the most advisable and just decision, with more information about the individuals and the causes and reason of each of them.³⁵

During the 1650s, the Spanish monarchy had learned at its own expense that it could expect little service or loyalty from Irish forces who were no longer willing to serve under its banner.³⁶ In the circumstances, the administration's decision was possibly the most sensible one. It was known that many soldiers were determined to leave, regardless of whether they were officially released from service. For example, when the maestro de campo, Miguel Dongan [Dangan] requested leave to return to Ireland, it was 'with the resolution of doing it even if he doesn't obtain his licence'.³⁷ Thus, the council decided to reform his unit and amalgamate it with the tercio of Dionisio O'Mahon [Mahon], 'who serves and has more roots in Spain, for reason of having been married there'.³⁸

During the Restoration period, Irish soldiers were not only less numerous in the Spanish armies, their prestige also diminished. Their practice of changing sides, illustrated most dramatically in 1653 at Hosterlic and Bidassoa, had persisted (albeit on a smaller scale) throughout the rest of the decade and tarnished their reputation in the eyes of the monarchy.³⁹ Philip IV admitted his suspicion of the Irish in 1653 when he confessed to his spiritual adviser, Sor Maria de Ágreda (1602-65), that 'in ... [Catalonia] the Irish have betrayed us, passing most of them over to the enemy, and we cannot trust those who still remain, because at every step they threaten us with doing the same'.⁴⁰

Almost ten years later, the above-mentioned colonels Dangan and O'Mahon presented a complaint about the discrimination they suffered while they served

³⁵ 'a los oficiales vivos irlandeses que pretendieren licencia con causa legitima se la conceda dándose cuenta, y que en cuanto a los soldados de la misma nación lo participe a sus cabos y oiga lo que se les ofreciere para que con mayor noticia de los sujetos y según la causa y razón de cada uno tome el temperamento que le pareciese mas conveniente y justo.' See consulta of the Council of War, 19 Sept. 1661 (AGS, GM, leg. 1981). ³⁶ Óscar Recio Morales, *España y la pérdida del Ulster: Irlanda en la estrategia política de la monarquía Hispánica, 1602-1649* (Madrid, 2003), pp 193-218. ³⁷ 'con resolución de hacerlo, aunque no se le de'. See consulta of the Council of War, 17 Aug. 1661 (AGS, GM, leg. 1981). ³⁸ 'que sirve y tiene mas raíces en España, por haberse casado en ella'. See consulta of the Council of War, 17 Aug. 1661 (AGS, GM, leg. 1981). The order was carried in September 1661 (AGS, GM, leg. 1981), reform of the army of Extremadura, 24 Sept. 1661; Dempsi's tercio moved to Spain one year later, in 1662, see report on the pay of the letters from Madrid, 3 May 1662 (AGS, E., leg. 2100). ³⁹ Stradling, *Spanish monarchy*, pp 116-19. ⁴⁰ 'en cuya provincia [Catalonia] nos hecho traición los irlandeses, pasándose los más al enemigo, y de los que quedan no nos podemos fiar, porque a cada paso nos amenazan con que harán lo mismo.' See Philip IV to Maria de Ágreda, 13 Aug. 1653 (Carlos Seco Serrano, *Cartas de sor María de Jesús de Ágreda y de Felipe IV* (Madrid, 1958), pp 320-1) and Maria's answer to Philip IV, 21 Aug. 1653 (ibid., pp 321-2).

in garrisoned towns during the Spanish campaign against Portugal. They lamented their exclusion from guard duty on the gates to these towns since this was one of the privileges granted to both Irish and Spanish infantry. These privileges had served as symbols of the Spanish monarchy's special regard for Irish soldiers. However, latterly, although the Council of State and the Council of War were prepared to acknowledge the privileges of the Irish tercios, both signalled their suspicion of the Irish, stipulating that the gates of the towns should not be entrusted to those 'in whom there is any distrust'.⁴¹ At the same time it is important not to overstate the authorities' suspicions of the Irish. The Spanish monarchy continued to grant individual pensions to Irish soldiers who displayed particular courage.⁴² Similarly, the extraordinary pay of 200 reales was still offered to those less fortunate soldiers whose wounds left them unable to serve in the army and who desired to return to Ireland.⁴³ However, those who went back to Ireland hoping to regain properties confiscated in the Cromwellian settlement found themselves embroiled in difficulties that made their task almost impossible.⁴⁴

Not all the Irish serving in the Spanish army hoped to return to their country. For example, in 1661, the maestro de campo Philip O'Reilly (1599in/after 1664) offered to raise a new regiment of Irishmen for service in the Spanish Netherlands.⁴⁵ He had been accused in Brussels of maintaining treacherous relations with France and with Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658) during the 1650s, though these allegations were never proven. In spite of an escape from prison and the disbandment of his regiment in 1660, O'Reilly was cleared of any guilt that same year.⁴⁶ He subsequently offered to serve in the Spanish army with a new levy comprised of his relatives and followers. According to Caracena, O'Reilly's disinterest in returning to Ireland stemmed from the fact that 'he is a gentleman of much retinue in Ireland, and that he

⁴¹ 'en cuales no se pueda tener ningún recelo'. See consulta of the Council of War, 17 Aug. 1661 (AGS, GM, lego 1981). ⁴² For an illustration of the difficulties associated with obtaining such a pension see consulta of the Council of State, 28 Oct. 1661 (AGS, E., leg. 2100). ⁴³ For an example of the many wounded soldiers who wished to return to Ireland see consulta of the Council of War, 2 Mar. 1657 (AGS, Guerra Antigua (hereinafter GA), lego 1913). ⁴⁴ L.J. Arnold, *The Restoration land settlement in County Dublin, 1660-1688: a history of the administration of the Acts of Settlement and Explanation* (Dublin, 1993); Karl S. Bottingheimer, *English money and Irish land: the 'Adventurers' in the Cromwellian settlement of Ireland* (London, 1971); William F.T. Burler, *Confiscation in Irish history* (London, 1970); Francis Godwin James, *Lords of the Ascendancy: the Irish House of Lords and its members, 1600-1800* (Dublin, 1995); Jane Ohlmeyer, *Civil war and Restoration in the three Stuart kingdoms: the career of Randal MacDonnell, marquis of Antrim* (Cambridge, 1993, rept. Dublin, 2001), pp 258-77. ⁴⁵ On O'Reilly and his troops see *Wild Geese in Spanish Flanders*, ed. Jennings, pp 18-19, documents 2116-7 (p. 613 n. 2116 a and b), 2140, 2154, 2166, 2190, 2217, 2223, 2228, 2230, 2233-4, 2236, 2264 (p. 622 n.), 2268, 2278, 2300, 2307-8, 2312, 2401. ⁴⁶ *Wild Geese in Spanish Flanders*, ed. Jennings, documents 2236, 2342, 2344, 2346, 2349 and 2355.

also wielded his sword against the father of the present king and later against the Protector'.⁴⁷ O'Reilly's case was far from exceptional: in the same letter addressed to the king, Caracena requested instructions about what to do 'with all the other Irish that are there' in similar circumstances.⁴⁸

Irish merchant communities established in the Iberian Peninsula benefited greatly from the transportation of troops from Ireland to the Spanish territories on the Continent during the 1650s. This was certainly true of individual merchants such as Richard White who capitalised on both Hugh Dubh O'Neill's terms of surrender at Limerick and his own family contacts in the Flanders army to make a business out of transporting Irish soldiers to the Iberian Peninsula.⁴⁹ In 1650 White applied for and was granted the privileged status of a 'neighbour with domicile' in Bilbao. He secured this position 'in spite of the fact that he is not married to a Spanish woman but to an Irishwoman'.⁵⁰ While the stages in the evolution of the Irish commercial communities within the Spanish territories in Western Europe during the Restoration era are as yet not well known, it is clear that it was at the end of the seventeenth century, with the arrival of the Jacobite diaspora, that the Irish merchant community entered its most dynamic period.⁵¹

The evolution of the Irish religious and student communities throughout the Spanish territories after the Restoration was far from thriving. Although the Irish Colleges continued their work, from the middle of the seventeenth century they struggled to survive owing to a combination of weak economic foundations and low numbers of students. In general terms, the situation of the Irish Colleges paralleled the financial crisis and decline of the Castilian university system in which many Irish College students pursued at least part of their studies.⁵² In short, when the attractiveness of the Castilian universities

⁴⁷ 'por ser este caballero de mucho sequito en Irlanda, y que así manejó siempre las armas contra el padre del Rey presente, y después contra el Protector'. See consulta of the Council of State, 31 July 1661 (AGS, E., lego 2098).⁴⁸ 'con todos los demás irlandeses que allí ay'. See consulta of the Council of State, 31 July 1661 (AGS, E., lego 2098). In its reply, the Council of State instructed Caracena to investigate discreetly O'Reilly's case once again and thereafter to report back to Madrid at which point a final decision on the matter would be made. See consulta of the Council of State, 30 Apr. 1661 (AGS, E., lego 2098). O'Reilly is also mentioned in a report on the army in 1661, 7 Sept. 1661 (AGS, E., lego 2098) and in a consulta of the Council of State, 30 Apr. 1661 (same leg.).⁴⁹ Stradling, *Spanish monarchy*, pp 73-74. Hugh Dubh O'Neill (d. 1660/61).⁵⁰ 'vecino, y domiciliario' and 'sin embargo de que no case con mujer vizcaína, sino irlandesa'. See Alonso Pérez Cantarero to the corregidor of Biscay, 29 May 1650 (AGS, GA, leg. 209, f. 200v.).⁵¹ See K. Schüller, 'Irish migrant networks and rivalries in Spain, 1575-1659' in O'Connor and Lyons (eds), *Irish migrants in Europe*, pp 88-103; M.B. Villar García (ed.), *La emigración irlandesa en el siglo XVIII* (Málaga, 2000); Agustín Guimerá Ravina, *Burguesía extranjera y comercio atlántico: la empresa comercial irlandesa en Canarias (1703-1771)* (Santa Cruz de Tenerife, 1985) and especially the ongoing doctoral research of Diego Téllez A. Iarcia (Universidad de la Rioja) on Ricardo Wall.⁵² R.L. Kagan points to evidence of the deterioration of the Castilian university system by the middle of the seventeenth century. See

declined, the Irish Colleges, whose financial constitution had never been healthy, suffered in consequence.⁵³ The clergy had been central in the political participation of the Irish community throughout the Spanish territories of continental Europe during the 1640s and 50s. Despite the gloomy mood that prevailed at the Spanish court in the 1660s, Irish clerics continually reminded the king of his commitments and responsibilities to preserve the Irish Colleges.⁵⁴ As international events unfurled from 1660 onwards, the political and military might of the Spanish monarchy in European affairs diminished and with it, the relative influence of the Irish community in Spain. In light of both developments, did the Irish have any rôle to play in Spanish foreign policy?

As already noted above, during the early 1660s the Spanish king was still tempted to intervene in the domestic political affairs of the Stuarts. When Watteville arrived in London in 1660, an English Jesuit wrote to Rome expressing the hope that, with a Spanish ambassador now resident in the kingdom, the Society of Jesus could once again benefit from his patronage and protection.⁵⁵ However, at the Spanish court, plans concerning England and Ireland, including a projected invasion of Ireland, were the subject of serious discussion, though significantly without any known Irish involvement. This contrasts sharply with the pattern in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries when any sign of deterioration in Anglo-Spanish relations was inevitably accompanied by a flurry of opportunistic Irish intrigue in Spanish political circles.⁵⁶ While in the 1660s the Irish may have been silent on the

R.L. Kagan, 'Universities in Castile, 1500-1810' in Lawrence Stone (ed.), *The university in society* (Princeton, 1974), pp 395-6. ⁵³ The same process occurs in San Gregory of Seville, where the crisis of San Hermenegildo College deeply affected the institution. See Martin Murphy, *St Gregory's College, Seville, 1592-1767* (Southampton, 1992); Patricia O Connell, *The early modern Irish college network in Iberia* in Thomas O'Connor (ed.), *The Irish in Europe, 1580-1815* (Dublin, 2001) pp 49-64 and *idem*, 'The Irish College, Santiago de Compostela: 1605-1767' in *Archivum Hibernicum*, 1 (1996), pp 19-28. Óscar Recio Morales's recent study on the Irish College at Alcalá, dramatically illustrates the problems of the institution after its last foundation in 1649. See Óscar Recio Morales, *Irlanda en Alcalá: la comunidad irlandesa en la Universidad de Alcalá y su proyección Europea. 1579-1785* (Alcalá de Henares, 2004), pp 170 ff. I am very grateful to Dr Recio Morales who kindly provided me with a copy of his work. ⁵⁴ See memorial in favour of Guillermo de León, 15 June 1663 (AGI, Indf., leg. 161, f. 330); Cardinal Aragón to Charles II, 15 Feb. 1664 (AGI, Indf., leg. 3037); the council of Indias to Diego González de Arce, 10 Feb. 1673 (AGI Indf., leg. 440, 26, ff 278v.-279v.; Manuel de Lira to the marquis of Canales, 23 Apr. 1681 (AGS, E., leg. 3866). The Jesuits also produced a publication to encourage donations for Ireland. See Geronimo Suitman, *Suplica que haze a los piadosos en favor de la mission de la compañía de Jesus en Irlanda* (Madrid, 1674) (n. v.). ⁵⁵ Edouardus Courtneus to the general, 29 Nov. 1660 (Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Anglia, Epistola Generali, MS 2, ff 290v.-230). ⁵⁶ Enrique García Hernán, *Irlanda y el rey prudente* (2 vols, Madrid, 2000 and 2003); Glyn Redworth, *The prince and the infanta: the cultural politics of the Spanish match* (New Haven, CT & London, 2003). See also above notes 18 and 36.

Spanish monarchy's plans vis-a-vis the Stuart kingdoms, they were not entirely political!y inactive. Instead they invested their energies in other more modest designs.

Shortly before the Restoration, Nicholas French (1604-78), Roman Catholic bishop of Ferns in the south-east of Ireland, had attempted to obtain the support of France and Spain while the negotiations of the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) were stil! in progress. French presented to both Luis Méndez de Haro and Cardinal Mazarin⁵⁷ a short Latin treatise in which he stressed the sufferings of the Catholics and the disasters of the late war and begged for shows of piety and sympathy from the two favourites.⁵⁸ He pressed for the religious duty of the Catholic princes to be prioritised over other petty interests since both were 'Catholic and most powerful monarchs, potent protector s of the church and pillar s of the faith'.⁵⁹ Mazarin and Haro were urged to act as fathers of the fatherland, by which he meant not only France or Spain but 'al! Europe, which attends this congress in Irun, hoping for their health and advantage.⁶⁰ Among those needing their protection, of course, were the tormented Catholics of Ireland and England. French explained:

For many years we had the same miserable fortune regarding religion; and for its defence we live in exile, persecuted, not quite finished. Let the protection of your two powerful kings be our shelter, under whose greatness we have preserved our lives in order to obtain such a glorious and sublime objective, in my own name, and in that of all the rest, I offer you the tears of the widows, the prayers of the just, the sighs of the aged, the requests of the exiles, the sacrifices of the priests; in whose number are included the innumerable and distinguished confessors of Christ, who consecrated the prisons with their presence, the chains and racks with their torments and the very blades with their blood.⁶¹

⁵⁷ During the minority of Louis XIV, while his mother, Anne of Austria (1601-66) served as regent, Cardinal Jules Mazarin (1602-61) was her chief advisor and royal chancellor. ⁵⁸ Nicholas French, *Protesta y suplica de los católicos de Irlanda, y de la Gran Bretaña al ... Cardenal Julio Mazerino y al Excelentísimo Señor D. Luys Mendez de Haro y Sotomayor, CondeDuque de Olivares ... para el ajustamiento de paces, entre las dos coronas de España y Fràcia [sic]* (Seville, Juan Lorenzo, 1659). I would like to thank Miguel Córdoba for kindly providing me with a copy of this documento. ⁵⁹ 'Catolicos potentissimos monarcas, protectores fortissimos de la Iglesia y columnas de la fe'. See *ibid.*, p 5. ⁶⁰ 'toda Europa, que acude a este congresso de Irun, pretendiente de su salud, y de su interés'. See *ibid.*, p. 7. ⁶¹ 'Que tantos años à tenemos la misma miserable fortuna, que es la religión; y por su defensa vivimos desterrados, perseguidos, solo no acabados. Séanos asilo la Protección de vuestros dos potentísimos reyes, debajo de cuya grandeza hemos reservado la vida. Que para la conclusión de fin tan glorioso y sublime, en nombre mio, y de todos os ofrezco las lagrimas de las viudas, las oraciones de los justos, los suspiros de los ancianos, la mendiguez de los desterrados, los sacrificios de los sacerdotes; en cuyo venerable numero son sin numero los ilustres confesores de Cristo, que consagraron con su

He pleaded that the French and the Spanish monarchs, now at peace, would not forget about the suffering of these Catholics. Finally, although he criticised the pernicious effects of the Treaty of Münster (1648),⁶² he sought neither a total restoration of Catholicism nor a Royalist invasion. Rather he asked only

that we shall worship our God, that we shall employ ourselves freely in the holy courses of the Catholic religion, even if not publicly and with the splendour customary to the other nations in your kingdoms.⁶³

On reading French's treatise it is clear that the era of Irish dissidents targeting the Spanish crown with solicitations for warships, cannons and soldiers to fight against the English Protestants had passed.⁶⁴ French's appeals fell on deaf ears and during the entire Restoration period, the petitions presented by Irishmen at court in Madrid were even more modest than those outlined by the bishop.

The first successful petition presented late in 1663 did not, in fact, have much to do with Ireland, though the writer - an Irish Franciscan, Patrick Duffy - was procurator in Madrid of the Irish Franciscans and in 1671 would be appointed bishop of Clogher. Duffy complained to Philip IV that changes being introduced by Rome were aimed at altering election procedures for the governing body of the Franciscan Order.⁶⁵ He alleged that Pope Alexander VII (1599-1667) was trying to impose direct election of the governing body of the Order instead of allowing general chapter to do so, as had traditionally been the practise. Stradling claims that by the 1660s, 'the alliance of Spain and the Irish Franciscans was clearly a thing of the past.'⁶⁶ It might well have been so. However, as in previous episodes of Irish political activity at the Spanish court, Duffy's petition convinced the Spanish king that it was in Spain's interests to help him in resisting the pope on this issue. Duffy warned that even though the present pope was pro-Spanish, a future pope who might be hostile to Spanish

presencia las cárceles, con sus tormentos las cadenas, los potros, y con sus sangre los cuchillos'. See *ibid.*, p. 8. ⁶² By the terms of the Treaty of Münster, Spain formally recognised the *fait accompli* of Dutch independence. ⁶³ 'que podamos adorar a nuestro Dios, ocuparnos en los ejercicios santísimos de la religión católica libremente, ya que no con publicidad y con la magnificencia que en sus reinos las demás naciones'. See *ibid.*, p. 8. On the Irish interpretation on the treaties of 1648 see Declan M. Downey, 'An Irish perspective on the Westphalian peace of 1648' in Bernardo José García García (ed.), *350 años de la paz de Westfalia: del antagonismo a la integración en Europa* (Madrid, 1999), pp 403-14. ⁶⁴ French's appeal was soon afterwards translated from Latin into Spanish by personnel in the Irish College, Seville and put through the printing press some days before Christmas 1659, when the negotiations in the Bidassoa were over. On French see Jason McHugh, 'Catholic clerical responses to the Restoration: the case of Nicholas French' (unpublished conference paper, delivered at the Restoration Ireland, c.1660-c.1685 conference, Dublin, September, 2004). ⁶⁵ Memorial of Patricio Duffio, 29 Dec. 1663 (AGS, E., leg. 3037). On Duffy's career see Benignus Millet OFM, *17th Irish Franciscans, 1651-1665* (Rome, 1964), pp 14, 59-61, 528-32. ⁶⁶ Stradling, *Spanish monarchy*, p. 137. See also pp 134-7 for treatment of the Irish Franciscans' disenchantment with the Spanish monarchy.

interests could force a change within the Order. He highlighted the fact that under the old system, the majority of those eligible to vote in the Order's general chapter came from Spanish territories. Consequently, he argued, if the autonomy of the Order was preserved (Duffy's main goal), the Spanish monarchy would continue to enjoy the loyalty of the Franciscans. He concluded with an ominous warning that if a governing body sympathetic to Spanish interests were to be elected by Alexander VII and were to cause no harm to the monarchy in the short term, it was entirely possible that the situation might change in the future.⁶⁷ Duffy succeeded in mobilising the king to exercise his powerful political influence at the Curia.⁶⁸ Writing from Rome some months later, Cardinal Aragón, who had instructed to deal with the matter, dismissed what he regarded as unfounded Franciscan fears concerning the affair. He explained that

this proposition [Duffy's memorial] will have been presented to H.M. By the same order [the Franciscans] whose general came to me with this suspicion, which I scorn for being unfeasible and originated by the very same clerymen; however, I will carefully observe what ensues.⁶⁹

The other known case of Irish lobbying at the Spanish court was made possible by the mediation of the conde de Caracena in 1664. It had been common practice in the past for Irish political activists to communicate with the Spanish authorities in Brussels instead of attempting to negotiate directly with the authorities in Madrid.⁷⁰ Moreover, Caracena has already been shown to have enthusiastically favoured the policy of cultivating unrest in England and Ireland, and even to have entertained the prospect of orchestrating a military campaign in Ireland if the appropriate opportunity arose. He may therefore have wished to present the document at the centre of this episode in Irish intrigue at the Spanish court in Madrid as further proof of the deep sense of frustration and the degree of political instability that prevailed in Ireland at that time.⁷¹ This memorial, penned by an unknown Irishman, was considered on its own merits in Madrid, in isolation from the ongoing debates between those who favoured intervention in British affairs to advance the Spanish

⁶⁷ Cardinal Aragón to Philip IV, 15 Feb. 1664 (AGS, E., leg. 3037). ⁶⁸ The Spanish Council of State decided to inform the Spanish Cardinal Aragón and Francesco Barberino about the Spanish influence in Rome. See ThomasJames Dandeleet, *Spanish Ronze, 1500-1700* (New Haven & London, 2001). ⁶⁹ 'esta proposición la habrán movido a V. M. de la misma orden y el general della vino con este recelo, que lo desprecio por impracticable y nacido de los mismos religiosos; pero estaré con cuidado observando lo que se ofreciere'. See Cardinal Aragón to Philip IV, 15 Feb. 1664 (AGS, E., leg. 3037). ⁷⁰ I. Pérez Tostado, "'Fiarse cautamente": The circulation of information and the Irish pressure group in the court of Spain' in García Hernán et al. (eds), *Irlanda y la monarquía hispánica*, pp 491-502. ⁷¹ Blasco de Loyola to -, 3 Nov. 1664 (AGS, E., leg. 3037).

conquest of Portugal and more cautious elements who were not willing to risk a new war. The memorial warned the Spaniards about 'the English plans not only to extirpate the Irish nation, but also the Catholic faith from that kingdom'.⁷² It described as disastrous the pope's decision to appoint only candidates who were acceptable to Charles II and James Butler, duke of Ormond (1610-88), lord lieutenant of Ireland, to Irish bishoprics in the belief that the English monarch would eventually publicly convert to Roman Catholicism. 'Woe is me,' lamented the author, 'the king [Charles II] is neither Catholic nor friend of them, deceives the pope and laughs at him.'⁷³ He claimed that only the earls of Tyrone and Tyrconnell deserved credit for the preservation of Roman Catholicism in Ireland since, through the aegis of the Spanish ambassadors in Rome, the earls had proposed worthy churchmen to the Irish bishoprics. This, he asserted, was the reason why the Catholic faith had been preserved 'among so many revolutions'.⁷⁴ The memorial concludes with a dramatic appeal:

Accordingly, the clergy, nobility and people of Ireland, prostrate (by mediation of RE. [Caracena]) at the feet of his Catholic Majesty, most humbly supplicate to deign to favour them by conserving what remains of the Catholic faith, since they already give up hope of recovering their worldly goods; they also ask His Majesty to be intermediar y with His Holiness in order that the ancient way of choosing the prelates in Ireland since the time in which the heresy begun to be maintained, and that no bishop be consecrated without the recommendation of His Majesty's ambassador.⁷⁵

Although this baroque style was traditionally a defining characteristic of memorials addressed to the king of Spain by the Irish community, the closing statement is revealing in terms of the evolution of Irish expectations of the Spanish monarchy. The writer did not ask for a Spanish invasion. Neither did he seek substantial assistance. The Irish had evidently already given up hope of recovering their worldly possessions by means of a Spanish assault or diplomacy. Their only remaining aspiration was to be permitted to practice the

⁷² 'el designio que tienen Ingleses no solo de extirpar la nación Irlandesa sino también la fe Católica en aquel reino'. See Blasco de Loyola to -, 3 Nov. 1664 (AGS, E., leg. 3037). ⁷³ 'Pero ay de mi, el rey ni es Católico ni tampoco amigo dellos, engaña al pontífice, y se rie del!'. See memorial sent to Caracena from London, 29 Aug. 1664 (AGS, E., leg. 3037). ⁷⁴ 'entre tantas revoluciones' (ibid.). ⁷⁵ 'Por tanto, el clero, nobleza, y populares de Irlanda, postrados (por mediación de V. E.) a los pies de su Mag. Católica, suplican muy humildemente sea servido de favorecerles conservando lo que queda de la fe Católica, ya que desesperan de cobrar sus bienes temporales, y as si mismo suplican a Su M., sea medianero para con su Santidad para que el antiguo modo de escoger prelados en Irlanda desde que comenzo la heregia se continúe, y que ninguno sea consagrado, sino fuere recomendado por el embaxador de Su Mag' (ibid.).

Catholic faith. Echoing Duffy's plea of the previous year, the author of this memorial made only one request - that Spanish influence be exerted in Rome in relation to episcopal appointments. Significantly, the possibility of the Spanish king defending the interests of the Irish Catholic community in his negotiations with the English monarch - an idea which had been widely accepted in the Spanish court not long before - was not even proposed.⁷⁶

The memorial forwarded by Cara cena was well received by the Council of State and by the king himself. Spain's allies in Rome were encouraged to use their influence in opposing the appointment of candidates to Irish bishoprics on the grounds of their acceptability to Charles II and Ormond, thus capitalising on their 'being so convenient to block such perverse plans, and preserve the few Irish Catholics that exist today'.⁷⁷

To my knowledge, there was no further attempt on the part of the Irish to influence Spanish political activity during the remainder of the Restoration period. On the one hand, the dramatic scaling-down of Irish political expectations and the reduced volume of Irish activity at the Spanish court testify to the demise of Irish political intrigue. However, these developments can equally be viewed in a positive light, demonstrating a greater degree of realism and maturity in Irish political expectations. By ensuring that they did not ask for more than the Spanish monarchy was able to offer at the time, and by presenting a cogently argued statement of their case, a handful of Irish petitioners managed to obtain the modest level of support they requested.

In conclusion, during the Restoration period, the depleted and weakened Irish Catholic community within the Spanish territories continued to play a role in Spanish politics, albeit a significantly diminished one, as illustrated most dramatically in their exclusion from Spain's plans to overthrow the Stuart dynasty during the early 1660s. By then, Spain's glory days as a major European power and champion of Catholicism had well passed. As the eruption of hostilities with France approached once again, the Spanish king was forced to cultivate the friendship of the Stuart king and the Dutch republic. Thus, the configuration of international political alliances, the domestic situation of the Spanish monarchy and the declining influence of the Irish community within the Spanish polity finally convinced the Irish to reduce to a minimum their political aspirations. Their pragmatism brought them some modest success in mobilising Spanish Imperial machinery to their advantage when they lobbied for support in the campaign to preserve Catholicism in Ireland. Many of the Irishmen and women who did not return to Ireland after

⁷⁶ See for example Glyn Redworth, 'Beyond faith and fatherland: The appeal of the Catholics of Ireland', c. 1623' in *Archivium Hibernicum*, lii (1998), pp 3-23; A.J. Loomie, 'Olivares, the English Catholics and the peace of 1630' in *Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire*, 47 (1969), pp 54-66.⁷⁷ 'siendo tan conveniente atajar designios tan perversos, y conservar los pocos católicos irlandeses que ay hoy'. See Blasco de Loyola to -, 3 Nov. 1664 (AGS, E., lego 3037).

the Restoration gradually lost the memory of their roots and integrated into the Castilian population.⁷⁸ However, for those who still dreamed of securing protection for their Catholic homeland from Europe's Catholic monarchs, it was Paris, rather than Madrid, that emerged as the new, more promising court of appeal.

⁷⁸ The Archivo Histórico de Protocolos (Madrid) collection, especially the last wills of those who died in the hospitals (usually the poorest people), offers an insight into how this evolution occurred. Some policies of the Spanish monarchy also promoted this process. Thus, by law, the Irish in Spain were placed on a level with the Castilian population. See Royal decree on the privileges and rights awarded to the Irish, 1792 (AGI, Consulados, lego 53).